1 | your next witness please.

MR. DELFOSSE: I call Mr. William Miller to the stand please.

Whereupon,

WILLIAM MILLER

was called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. DELFOSSE:

Q Mr. Miller, isn't it true that in June of 2003 and continuing through December of 2003, you represented to Liberty Services Corporation that you had procured insurance for LSC from various insurers?

A On the advice of counsel I decline to answer and invoke protection against self incrimination --

MR. DELFOSSE: Your Honor, at this time we would ask that based on Mr. Miller's statement and the submission of his previous affidavit and subject to the motions that have been submitted, we ask that the MIA — that an instruction be given to the witness to answer the question.

MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, may we be heard?

ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: You certainly may.

MR. SIMMS: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I thank you for the opportunity. This brings forward, I guess the intersection between the respondent's due process rights and his rights under the Fifth Amendment. We submitted a hearing -- won't cover the entire ground but let me just be clear. I think we've arrived at a point in which the administrative process, where the respondent has challenged the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of that affidavit.

It is certainly the hearing officer's, certainly discretion to make a decision with respect to the jurisdictional issues; however, I would point out at this time that if there was a ruling one way, this issue with respect to the Fifth Amendment obviously would be moot. I point that out because later in my argument, as I will indicate, the affidavit and the motion were offered in tandem for that limited purpose of effectuate his constitutional right.

And so therefore it is unlike any of the situations that are discussed in any of the cases, in any of the matters suggested by counsel for the MIA in which the Fifth Amendment privilege has been waived. The similar case on that issue is Rogers v. United States as has been indicated, and in that case a witness actually testified before a grand jury and was sworn and in that case the issue became this witness who was the treasurer of the Communist party was asked whether or not she submitted documents to another person. She had previously, earlier in her testimony, admitted possession of those documents.

The Supreme Court, as you know, upheld the contempt based on the fact that since she had already indicated certain incriminating facts or certain facts, she could not deny or could not stop her testimony and would have to divulge the remainder of her remarks and respond to the question. But the case in and of itself is not really a waiver case because on page 374, it indicates the court must address the question of whether in view of the testimony already given, disclosure of the

details demanded presents a reasonable danger of further incrimination in light of all of the circumstances.

In other words, regardless of the prior testimony, there is still a significant application of the test, looking for reasonable danger based on whether or not incriminating facts have been presented and looking at it under the specific circumstances of where the witness is. This witness is not an accused in a criminal case. This witness is not testifying in any grand jury. In fact, the witness showed up by virtue of a motion for purpose of an affidavit to assert his constitutional rights to through the due process scenario.

In that perspective, it's unlike all of the other scenarios in cases relied upon by the respondent. So again, the witness is not an accused. There is no indictment pending. He should be not treated as a defendant as the hearing member at least tries to analogize him to a defendant and analogize in consolidated orders in terms of a charging or an indictment if you will. It is not an indictment. He is

a witness in a witness context for purposes of these proceedings.

1.5

And in all the cases in this state, including Choy (phonetic), there has to be a very, very careful look at an individual's Fifth Amendment rights before it is just liberally taken away. I stress again the limited purpose for which the affidavit was presented. And in this context, given the testimony, the testimony not be incriminating on the specs, given the fact that it was given for the sole limited purpose of challenging jurisdiction, the affidavit should not automatically be converted into any kind of a waiver for purposes of these proceedings. And so for those reasons we suggest that his Fifth Amendment as to both Liberty and as to Wilson remains intact and should not be stripped away.

ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Mr. Delfosse.

MR. DELFOSSE: The affidavit is not being converted into anything. It was offered as testimony by this witness on a substantive issue as to what his version of the facts concerning the jurisdiction of this hearing -- of the Administration to sanction him in this

matter. By making this presentation, making representations in that affidavit, he has put himself forth as -- for his version of the truth.

ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: How,

Mr. Delfosse, would he ever challenge the jurisdiction if

he couldn't put forth an affidavit that would still

protect his Fifth Amendment? How would he do that?

MR. DELFOSSE: By relying, by relying on the statements that are made by others, by any factual evidence that he wishes, other than making his own statements, and that's what he has done and that is what is what causes him to lose his Fifth Amendment protection in this case. He has put himself and his statements at issue through the affidavit. It is similar to the various statements throughout the cases that we cited for Rogers and in NutriMax.

When the person puts themselves at issue, their statement is at issue. What is a result of saying he can do this and still retain a right to exercise self -- the right to protection from self incrimination, the effect is to, as the cases say, allow him to present only half

the truth, to convert the protection into a -- to frustrate the Insurance Administration's ability to exercise its jurisdiction in this matter. What is it he is asking us to do? What he's asking us to do, by allowing him to say he has a waive is to only present those facts in the light that are available to him.

The evidence that the MIA has presented in this case shows clearly that the statements he makes are incriminating and should be subject to cross examination if he wishes to present them forth as the truth. That's all the MIA is asking for in this matter, is to cross examine and to find the truth after he has placed his voracity at issue. The cases that support this are the Rogers case and the NutriMax case in which clearly the affidavit is testimony and which the individual is putting themselves at risk. It is a wrong and that's why the Guy case was sited. This goes back to, to 1899. You don't get to present half the truth.

MR. SIMMS: The <u>Guy</u> case, if I may, may, Your Honor, the <u>Guy</u> case and those cases of <u>Allen</u> and so forth really fall in our cases in which an actual accused

defendant was charged and an individual in fact testified. The <u>Guy</u> case goes back to one of the counties in terms of an individual selling intoxicated liquor without a license and actually taking the witness stand on direct, giving a statement of facts and his version of the case and then being cross examined and trying to, trying to circumscribe the cross examination.

entirely different for <u>NutriMax</u> where people offered a gratuitous affidavit in motions to clarify certain, certain issues. This was an assertion of an absolute constitutional right in which he challenged jurisdiction. For all, all intents and purposes, he could have floated one document simply saying he's 21 years of age and Mr. Delfosse would still be standing here making the representations and arguments that he needs to be cross examined on how old he is.

The response in the affidavit is interpreted by counsel to be a total defense to the case. Not true. It is simply a challenge to the jurisdiction on element, and had we had a proceeding pre-trial with respect to this

issue, he could have presented conflicting evidence just as he's presented whatever conflicting evidence now. So he has the clear opportunity to present and challenge the evidence on another basis relating to what he reports is in the affidavit.

And then finally, in addition to all the other tools that Mr. Delfosse has, he has, based on his refusal to testify, an inference that he will undoubtedly argue, unless he decides to waive that himself, he will argue to Your Honor in terms of the defendant's -- my client's refusal to testify.

ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: You took away my question, Mr. Simms. So would you agree with me that if I uphold the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege that I can, I can properly make an inference based on his exercise of that?

MR. SIMMS: We already are aware, and Your Honor just took this morning Joint Exhibit 33, which is a list of questions for the three other companies. We are well aware that under the law and you've advised us that you have that permissible inference and if in fact you so

rule, you will have that inference as well with respect to Liberty and Wilson. We understand that.

ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: I have to tell you, Mr. Delfosse, that I -- counsel and I have discussed this. We've read the cases and I do believe that Mr. Simms has the better argument in this case. I do believe that Mr. Miller is somewhat hamstrung if he cannot submit an affidavit as to jurisdiction, not the underlying merits but the jurisdiction. And the court cases are fairly clear that I should -- you know, I have to -- there has to be a clear waiver because -- before I can determine that there is a waiver, and quite frankly I don't think an affidavit challenging jurisdiction raises to that level. So for that reason I'm going to allow Mr. Miller to exercise his Fifth Amendment right. I do not believe he has waived it.

MR. DELFOSSE: Your Honor, if we then could take a brief recess, I believe that we might be able to resolve this in a --

MR. SIMMS: Can the witness stay now?

ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Absolutely.

| 1 | MR. SIMMS: Thank you. |
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| 2 | ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Brief recess. |
| 3 | (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.) |
| 4 | ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Are we back on |
| 5 | the record? |
| 6 | COURT REPORTER: Yes. |
| 7 | MR. SIMMS: Counsel, which document and which |
| 8 | number will this be? |
| 9 | MR. DELFOSSE: This would be Hearing Officer |
| 10 | or this |
| 11 | ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Yes, Hearing |
| 12 | Officer. |
| 13 | MR. DELFOSSE: Hearing Officer 35. |
| 14 | MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, we will join the |
| 15 | stipulation. We just want to clarify that be entering |
| 16 | into the stipulation on the questions that the MIA is |
| 17 | proposing that they would ask William Ray Miller to |
| 18 | respond in this matter, we would not waive the motion |
| 19 | that we on jurisdiction. |
| 20 | ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: On |
| 21 | jurisdiction, I understand that. |
| | |

1 welcome. 2 Whereupon, 3 TODD CIONI 4 was called as a witness, having been first duly sworn, 5 was examined and testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION 6 7 BY MR. DELFOSSE: 8 Good afternoon, Mr. Cioni. 0 Good afternoon. 9 Α And although you have already done so 10 previously, could you just, for the record today -- it's 11 12 been quite some time -- state your name, occupation and 13 business address? 14 Α Absolutely. My name is P. Todd Cioni, C-i-o-n-I, the Associate Commissioner for the Compliance 15 16 and Enforcement Section of the Maryland Insurance 17 Administration, 525 St. Paul Place, Baltimore, Maryland. 18 And as the Associate Commissioner for the 0 19 Compliance and Enforcement Section, what are your duties 20 and what is -- what are your duties? 21 I oversee the market conduct and the agent